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Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) prohibits the admission of extrinsic evidence “to prove specific instances of a witness’s conduct in order to attack 
or support the witness’s character for truthfulness.” The 
rule was amended in 2003 to substitute the words “char-
acter for truthfulness” for the word “credibility” in an 
effort to make clear that the intent of the prohibition on 
extrinsic evidence was and is to exclude extrinsic evi-
dence offered to prove a witness’s general propensity for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness. Despite the Advisory Com-
mittee’s effort to clarify the limits on the ban on extrinsic 
evidence, courts frequently find the rule confusing. Most 
states have similar rules that are equally confusing.
United States v. Delgado-Marrero
An illustrative case is United States v. Delgado-Mar-
rero, 744 F.3d 167 (1st Cir. 2014), in which two police 
officers were charged and convicted of drug and fire-
arm offenses. The case arose from an FBI reverse 
sting—Operation Guard Shack—during which the 
FBI recruited two police officers to assist the agency 
in combatting police corruption in Puerto Rico. Offi-
cer I posed as a corrupt policeman with close ties to 
a mid- to high-level local drug dealer, and Officer II 
played the role of the dealer. The defendant officers 
were Raquel Delgado-Marrero (Delgado) and Angel 
Rivera-Claudio (Rivera), working partners at the Antil-
las Police Precinct in San Juan, Puerto Rico. The Rule 
608(b) issue in the case involved only Delgado, and the 
discussion here is largely confined to her.
Getting Involved
Delgado began as a municipal police officer in her late 
20s. Before the sting operation, she had five years of 
experience on the force, established a clean disciplin-
ary record without a single administrative complaint 
filed against her, and received the Municipal Police 
Woman of 2009 award.
In mid-2009, Officer I, who had grown up with Del-
gado and gone to school and shared friends with her, 
reached out to her in his undercover role as a corrupt 
policeman. Although they had lost touch over the years, 
Officer I decided to renew contact after meeting with 
Delgado’s ex-husband on an unrelated matter. Offi-
cer I learned from her ex-husband that Delgado was 
now divorced and had several part-time jobs provid-
ing nighttime security at veterinary clinics and pubs in 
“unsafe locations”—a term the officer interpreted to 
mean places where drug trafficking occurred.
Obtaining Delgado’s phone number from the ex-
husband, Officer I called and talked with her twice. But 
despite instructions from the FBI, he failed to record 
either call. Finally, on July 20, 2009, Officer I made 
a third phone call and recorded a conversation with 
Delgado in which it was clear that during the previous 
calls she had already accepted his invitation to act as 
security during a drug transaction for which she and 
an unnamed fellow officer (later identified as Rivera) 
would be paid $2,000 each.
Three days later, Officer I recorded another call 
in which he explained to Delgado how and where 
the transaction would take place. He told her that 
she and Rivera would be directed to a house and 
required to frisk two individuals involved in the drug 
buy to ensure that neither individual brought a gun 
into the house.
The next day, on July 24, 2009, Officer I was on the 
phone providing minute-by-minute directions to Del-
gado and Rivera that led them to an apartment outfitted 
by the FBI with hidden cameras and microphones, 
where Officer I and Officer II (the “drug dealer”) 
were waiting. When Delgado and Rivera arrived, 
the two were offered refreshments, and, for about 30 
minutes, the four of them engaged in friendly ban-
ter. When someone knocked on the door, Rivera was 
told to answer it and make certain no one entered the 
apartment armed. Officer I signaled Delgado to assist. 
After they cleared the man acting as the drug buyer, 
everyone moved back to the living room and the casual 
conversation continued until the buyer asked to see the 
“stuff,” saying he was ready to leave. Rivera was told 
to retrieve a duffle bag that contained dummy pack-
ages wrapped to look like “bricks” of cocaine—and 
after examining the contents in view of both Rivera and 
Delgado, the buyer shook hands with everyone, put the 
bag over his shoulder, and left. Officer I handed Rivera 
$4,000 in cash, Rivera counted it, and both Delgado 
and Rivera stated they were available for a second job.
The FBI did not arrest Delgado and Rivera until 
October 6, 2010, when they were indicted on four 
counts charging them with conspiracy to possess 
with intent to distribute cocaine, aiding and abetting 
another in an attempt to possess with intent to distribute 
cocaine, and knowingly possessing firearms in further-
ance of drug trafficking.
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Delgado’s Defense: Entrapment
Given the facts set forth above, it is not difficult to 
understand why Delgado did not deny she had agreed 
to participate in what was an apparent drug deal. It is 
much more difficult to understand Rivera’s defense, 
which was that Rivera had no intention of participat-
ing in the transaction before Delgado lured him into 
it. Although there were taped calls between Officer I 
and Rivera, the other trial evidence implicated him as 
much as Delgado.
The government presented the testimony of Offi-
cers I and II and of the FBI agent who had prepared 
the apartment and provided the material used in the 
staged drug transaction. The government also intro-
duced the two recorded calls between Officer I and 
Delgado, the video recording of the transaction, and 
five pictures of the “bricks” that were placed in the 
apartment by the FBI.
Delgado defended by claiming that she was 
entrapped by Officer I. Under federal law (unlike 
some states that focus objectively on the government’s 
conduct), entrapment has two components: (1) the 
government has taken steps to induce the accused to 
engage in criminal conduct, and (2) the accused was 
not predisposed to engage in that conduct.
Delgado’s Testimony
Delgado testified that over a period of a month, Offi-
cer I persistently offered her part-time employment, 
repeatedly called her, and sometimes took her out on 
dates; that he had a romantic, sexual affair with her in 
2005 and 2009; and that several weeks after the sting 
operation, he took her out on a date during which they 
had sexual intercourse. Delgado contended that she 
finally gave in to Officer I’s pressure.
The Rule 608(b) issue first arose before she took 
the stand during the cross-examination of Officer I and 
again when Delgado sought to offer the testimony of 
an acquaintance of Officer I, Brenda Rosa-Valentín.
Cross-Examination of Officer I
During cross-examination of Officer I, the government 
objected to a question regarding his recollection of his 
interactions with Rosa-Valentín. Delgado’s counsel 
proffered at a sidebar conference that Rosa-Valentín 
would testify that Officer I had offered her money in 
exchange for providing contact information of potential 
police officers to entrap, and confessed to her his desire 
to kill a man he thought had wronged her brother. The 
judge indicated that he would not permit such ques-
tions unless he first heard from Rosa-Valentín, but he 
would permit Delgado to recall Officer I if a proper 
foundation were laid for the questions.
Delgado’s counsel got Officer I to admit that he had 
offered money to Rosa-Valentín in exchange for police 
officers’ names. Officer I said that he first mentioned 
the offer to Rosa-Valentín during a chance encoun-
ter while on duty when he responded to a late-night 
complaint of loud music during her birthday party at a 
commercial establishment. He denied, however, drink-
ing beer at the party or allowing the party to continue 
after closing time in violation of a municipal ordinance. 
He also denied going to Rosa-Valentín’s house more 
than 15 times in the days following the birthday party.
After the government rested, Delgado sought to call 
Rosa-Valentín as her counsel had previously proffered. 
The government objected that her testimony was irrel-
evant. Delgado’s counsel repeated the proffer made 
during cross-examination, and the trial judge stated 
that he would hear the evidence outside the presence 
of the jury.
Outside the jury’s presence, Rosa-Valentín testified 
that Officer I was her brother’s life-long friend, that 
she had known him for more than 30 years, and that 
Officer I twice stated during funeral services for her 
brother’s wife that he wanted to kill the man who he 
felt was responsible for her suicide. She also stated that 
Officer I told her about his shakedowns of drug dealers 
and fabrication of cases. She stated that Officer I had 
eight or nine beers at her birthday party and permitted 
it to continue until 4:30 a.m., and that Officer I came 
to her house the next day and persistently (sometimes 
up to seven times a day) for four months sought the 
names of police officers who could do some part-time 
work for him. He also offered her part-time work. The 
trial judge excluded the testimony as extrinsic evidence 
barred by Rule 608(b).
The Court of Appeals’ Holding
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit reversed, finding that the excluded testimony was 
not extrinsic evidence barred by Rule 608(b). The court 
instead reasoned “that Rosa-Valentín’s testimony would 
have shown how Officer I went about his participation 
in Operation Guard Shack and would thus support [Del-
gado’s] entrapment defense.” (Delgado-Marrero, 744 
F.3d at 180.) The court explained that Rosa-Valentín’s 
testimony was similar to Delgado’s and painted a pic-
ture of Officer I as relentlessly pursuing police officers 
as targets of the sting operation, including those who 
were not known as corrupt officers. Excerpts from the 
court’s opinion highlight its reasoning:
Delgado avers that Rosa-Valentín’s testimony 
contradicted Officer I’s in several respects, and 
it is clear from the record that this was the case. 
Officer I, among other things, disavowed con-
stantly visiting Rosa-Valentín after her birthday, 
whereas in her proffer she stated that it was pre-
cisely thereafter that Officer I harassed her for 
approximately four months, insisting that he be 
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provided with contact information of police offi-
cers to do part-time work, sometimes going to 
her house more than seven times per day. Rule 
608(b) does not preclude the introduction of this 
type of impeachment evidence.
More importantly, however, we agree with Del-
gado that Rosa-Valentín’s testimony would have 
shown how Officer I went about his participation 
in Operation Guard Shack and would thus sup-
port her entrapment defense.
It is black-letter law that an entrapment defense 
has two elements: (1) government inducement of 
the accused to engage in criminal conduct, and 
(2) the accused’s lack of predisposition to engage 
in such conduct. In connection with the induce-
ment prong, Rosa-Valentín and Delgado painted 
a similar picture of Officer I’s relentless pursuit 
of Operation Guard Shack part-time workers. 
Rosa-Valentín testified that Officer I offered her 
large amounts of money and pursued her for four 
months—sometimes going to her house more 
than seven times a day—trying to win her over 
so that she would provide contact information for 
part-time employees. In Delgado’s case, she tes-
tified that Officer I courted her almost daily for 
approximately one month before she capitulated.
Delgado’s and Rosa-Valentín’s testimonies simi-
larly reflected that Officer I tried to lure them into 
Operation Guard Shack activities by appealing 
to their long-lasting friendships. Delgado’s and 
Rosa-Valentín’s testimonies also reflected that 
Officer I attempted to manipulate his way around 
potential targets’ reluctance to participate in an 
Operation Guard Shack “part-time.” . . .
Furthermore,  Rosa-Valent ín’s  test i -
mony supported the propensity prong of 
Delgado’s entrapment defense. For example, 
Rosa-Valentín’s testimony showed that Offi-
cer I’s pursuit of potential Operation Guard 
Shack targets was not limited to corrupt offi-
cers. In this regard, she testified that Officer I 
persistently asked her for contact information 
of police officers, even though she told him 
she knew only officers seemingly involved in 
legitimate part-time work (her exact words on 
this were: “They worked at gas stations, that kind 
of thing”). Rosa-Valentín also testified that Offi-
cer I invited her to participate in a “part-time” 
herself, despite the fact that she had no crim-
inal record, links to the drug-trafficking trade, 
or involvement with the police force. Delgado 
testified similarly, stating that her untarnished 
criminal record shows that she had no inclina-
tion to engage in illegal activities before Officer 
I’s month-long pursuit.
(Id. at 179–81 (citations omitted) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).)
The court of appeals was critical of the govern-
ment’s argument concerning Rule 608(b), observing 
that the government’s entire argument in its brief was 
that “[t]he court correctly found [Rosa-Valentín’s] 
testimony inadmissible under Rule 608(b), which 
only permits inquiry into prior conduct if the conduct 
is probative of the witness’s character for truthful-
ness or untruthfulness.” (Id. at 181 (alterations in 
original).) The court responded to this argument by 
saying, “We have stated many times that such a lack-
adaisical effort is insufficient to carry the day.” (Id.) 
More importantly, however, the court specifically 
held that the excluded evidence was not barred by 
Rule 608(b) because it was probative of Delgado’s 
entrapment defense.
An Important Point
The court of appeals recognized something that must 
be kept in mind: “While it may be true that Rosa-
Valentín’s testimony incidentally called into question 
Officer I’s character for truthfulness, without more, 
such an effect does not render the testimony inadmissi-
ble.” (Id.) In short, evidence that is offered for a proper 
purpose (here, to prove entrapment) may have the addi-
tional effect of impeaching a witness such as Officer 
I, but when offered for a permissible purpose that evi-
dence is not excluded by Rule 608(b).
Other Government Arguments
Although the focus here is on Rule 608(b), two other 
government arguments warrant brief mention. First, 
the government argued that the testimony by Rosa-
Valentín would have been improper “collateral” 
impeachment. This argument serves to remind that 
there is no prohibition in the Federal Rules of Evidence 
on impeachment on a collateral matter. There is only 
Rule 608(b)’s ban on extrinsic evidence offered for a 
particular purpose. Arguments about “collateralness” 
are decided under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, and 
in this case the court of appeals clearly identified the 
importance of the excluded evidence.
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Second, the government argued that Rosa-Valentín’s 
testimony was improper prior bad acts testimony and 
was properly excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 
404(b)(1). This argument serves to remind that even 
when Rule 608(b) is not a bar to admission of evidence, 
another rule might be. But in this case, the evidence 
was used to show the methods used by Officer I to 
carry out his duties in the reverse sting operation, not 
to show his character generally.
Lessons
1. There is no general rule excluding evidence as 
collateral. Arguments about the collateral nature 
of evidence are properly addressed under Rule 
403.
2. Rule 608(b)’s ban on extrinsic evidence is lim-
ited to situations in which a party seeks to offer 
evidence of acts that a witness has denied for the 
purpose of showing that those acts occurred and 
suggest that the witness is an untruthful person.
3. Evidence offered to show that a police officer 
engaged in acts that might demonstrate entrap-
ment are not offered to suggest that the officer 
is untruthful.
4. If the officer denies the acts relied on to prove 
entrapment, evidence that the acts occurred might 
have the incidental effect of impeaching the offi-
cer, but as long as the acts are offered to prove 
entrapment they are offered for a permissible 
purpose.
5. Courts of appeal do not appreciate arguments 
made in a single sentence to defend an impor-
tant decision of a trial judge that is central to a 
defendant’s criminal appeal. n
